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This article investigates whether the Arctic Council has sought to discursively construct 
particular security issues via its declarations and other official outputs. Through a textual 
analysis of its publicly available documents, the authors examine the Council’s use of 
security language to assess whether such rhetoric is mobilized to identify specific threat-
referent relationships or in an ‘adjectival’ sense that does not construct particular issues 
as existentially threatening. They, moreover, reflect on the analytical usefulness of secu-
ritization theory, and the dynamics of constructing unconventional and contested security 






The Arctic Council is the principal institution for Arctic regional governance, and it is 
involved in numerous activities in the Arctic region. Although its mandate explicitly ex-
cludes matters related to military security, some scholars have argued that the Council 
nonetheless contributes to Arctic security governance through its coordinating and pol-
icy-shaping role on a variety of topics essential for the interests of states and human well-
being in the region (Charron 2012; Chater 2014; Chater and Greaves 2014; Greaves 2013; 
Wilson 2016). In this sense, the Arctic Council can be viewed as an unconventional se-
curity actor that contributes to framing different policy areas in ‘security’ terms. How-
ever, there has been limited empirical analysis of which issues the Arctic Council frames 
as security-relevant through its declarations and other official outputs, and what the spe-
cific security implications of those issues are understood to be. 
This article contributes to understanding the Arctic Council’s role as a security 
actor in the context of a rapidly changing circumpolar region, and provides a starting 
point for assessing securitizing moves by a regional international governmental organi-
zation. As such, it asks: Does the Arctic Council use security language to depict particular 
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issues as relevant to Arctic security? How does the Arctic Council understand the ‘secu-
rity-ness’ of those issues? Methodologically, the article undertakes textual analysis of the 
Council’s publicly available online documents, including multilateral agreements and 
declarations, policy papers, working group reports, public statements, and other related 
sources. It examines the Council’s use of security language to assess whether such rhet-
oric is mobilized to identify specific threat-referent relationships or whether such rhetoric 
is mobilized in an ‘adjectival’ sense that does not construct particular issues as existen-
tially threatening.  
The article proceeds in three sections. First, it outlines securitization theory as a 
framework for understanding the social construction of security issues. Second, it outlines 
the Arctic Council, and discusses the emerging role it has played in the governance of 
regional security issues, particularly ‘soft’, unconventional security issues that are not 
prohibited under its mandate. Third, it examines which issues the Council has articulated 
as security-relevant for the circumpolar region. We find there is some evidence to suggest 
that the Arctic Council depicts certain issues as relevant to security in the Arctic, but that 
most instances of its use of security language conform to adjectival uses of security rather 
than securitizing moves that identify specific threats. The concluding section offers some 
reflections on the Arctic Council and the construction of Arctic security issues, as well as 
theoretical reflections on the analytical usefulness of securitization theory, and the dy-





Although ‘security’ is often associated with the use of military force to defend the national 
interests of sovereign states, it is an essentially contested concept that has no fixed or 
inherent meaning (Smith 2005). Rather, security is contextual and a result of specific 
configurations of social relations within a given political context. What security means 
is, in short, socially constructed. Security is defined by how powerful or influential polit-
ical actors articulate its meaning and the specific security threats they identify, and 
whether their security claims become widely accepted and enacted into public policy. 
One approach for explaining the process through which security issues are so-
cially constructed is securitization theory, a “radically constructivist” account developed 
to explain the changing nature of security threats after the end of the Cold War (Buzan, 
Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). The core contribution of securitization theory is to provide 
a convincing framework for understanding how language and discourse interact with sys-
tems of power to (re)produce particular meanings of security that inform the ideas and 
practices of political actors (Balzacq 2011). Specifically, ‘securitization’ refers to the pro-
cess through which political issues are transformed into security issues, and thus elevated 
above the realm of ‘normal’ politics by legitimizing extraordinary measures to address 
them. Thus, “to ‘securitize’ an issue [is] to challenge society to promote it higher in its 
scales of values and to commit greater resources to solving the related problems” 
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(Sheehan 2005, 52), by claiming a privileged place for that issue within the associated 
realm of public policy. 
The process of securitization involves two basic steps. First, a social actor, called 
the securitizing actor, makes a securitizing move that identifies a relationship between a 
valued object and a phenomenon that threatens its survival or wellbeing. However, for a 
securitizing move to become successfully constructed as a security issue or threat, it must 
be accepted by an authoritative audience within a given political context, often though 
not exclusively a sovereign state. The second step in the securitization process is thus the 
adjudication of securitizing moves by an audience with the power to mobilize exceptional 
measures in defense of the threatened object (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). Once 
accepted, securitizing moves transform something into a security issue, legitimating ac-
tion corresponding with the urgency of being designated security-relevant. It is through 
this intersubjective process of making and accepting security claims that security issues 
and specific security threats are socially constructed, from which point they are often 
institutionalized and reproduced through the structures and routine practices used to man-
age security issues. 
Securitizing moves were originally conceived as speech acts, but they can also 
be written, visual, or semiotic representations of threat-referent relationships (Williams 
2003). In theory, anyone can be a securitizing actor and anything identified as a referent 
object in need of protection, but in practice not all actors or objects are equally positioned 
for successful securitization, nor can all phenomena be considered threatening (Greaves 
2016). But the basic logic that underpins securitizing moves is one of danger, emergency, 
and imminent crisis. Securitizing moves use language such as, but not limited to, ‘secu-
rity’, ‘insecurity’, ‘threat’, ‘survival’, and ‘danger’ to invoke an existential threat to a 
specified referent object with the goal of mobilizing an urgent political response. The 
discursive construction of something as threatened is more important than the specific 
language used. 
In this respect, ‘security’ and related terms can be used in ways that have distinct 
meanings and political implications. Bill McSweeney (1999) notes that security has both 
‘nominative’ and ‘adjectival’ forms that connote different things. The nominative form 
of security implies ‘protection from’, in the sense of security being a property of being 
free from threat or danger. Implicitly or explicitly, nominative uses of security invoke the 
need to protect a valued object from a threat to its survival or fundamental wellbeing. 
This encompasses the standard usage of security within international relations, whereby 
what is typically implied is the security of a sovereign state from the threats of military 
defeat or political subjugation. By contrast, adjectival forms of security connote an ‘abil-
ity to’, a positive attribute or aspiration in terms of the ability of people, states, or societies 
to satisfy particular needs and desires (McSweeney 1999, 14). Adjectival uses of security 
– such as food security, energy security, health security, etc. – do not necessarily specify 
threat-referent relationships, and do not conform to the discursive logic of securitization 
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insofar as they do not attempt to legitimate emergency measures in response to an exis-
tential threat to objects of social value. Rather, they describe aspirational conditions of 
satisfying particular social needs in various policy areas. 
The likely success of a securitizing move is structured by three ‘facilitating con-
ditions’: use of securitizing language, the authority and social capital of the securitizing 
actor, and the features of the threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 33). These con-
ditions shape whether securitizing moves invoke an existential threat, whether actors are 
heard, and which phenomena can be credibly securitized. Typically, state actors have 
been understood to possess privileged access to securitizing processes, but there is no 
given reason why state institutions alone should be able to make securitizing moves. In-
deed, some analyses depart from a strict focus on the state (Greaves 2013, 2016; Vuori 
2010), but conform to Ole Wæver’s (1995, 57) expectation that “security is articulated 
only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites,” even if those elites are 
transnational or non-state in nature. The remainder of this article examines the Arctic 
Council as an example of a non-state institutional actor that uses security language, but 
assesses its use of security language to determine whether it appears consistent with nom-
inative or adjectival uses of security. When the Arctic Council ‘speaks security’, does it 
seem designed to identify threat-referent relationships in order to mobilize a political re-
sponse from its member-states, or is it employed in an adjectival way to describe desirable 
conditions in different policy domains? 
Methodologically, securitization “aims to gain an increasingly precise under-
standing of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, 
with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securit-
ization is successful)” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 32). They note that “securiti-
zation can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The way to study securitization 
is to study discourse and political constellations” (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 
25). For this article, data on which issues the Arctic Council has identified as security-
relevant were collected through textual and discourse analysis of the Council’s publicly 
available online documents during the 20-year period from 1996-2016, including decla-
rations and agreements, policy papers, working group reports, public statements, and 
other related sources. These provide a representative sample of the Arctic Council’s out-
puts and thus reflect which issues it understands to be relevant to security in the Arctic 
region. 
 
Governance and the Arctic Council 
 
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 through intergovernmental agreement as a 
successor to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). It has a unique struc-
ture consisting of all eight Arctic states as Members, six Permanent Participants (PPs) 
representing Indigenous peoples from across the circumpolar region, and various non-
voting state and non-state Observers. The Council has a broad mandate to promote coop-
eration on environmental protection and sustainable development, as well as facilitating 
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and promoting the participation of Indigenous peoples in Arctic governance. Given the 
relative underdevelopment of a multilateral architecture in the circumpolar region during 
the Cold War, since the 1990s the Arctic Council has emerged as the premier forum for 
regional cooperation and governance, and is built on a consensus-based model of deci-
sion-making that affords all member-states and PPs the opportunity to influence the 
agenda and shape the Council’s outputs (English 2013). The reports and studies of the 
Arctic Council and its Working Groups – most prominently the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, the Arctic Human Development Report, and the Arctic Marine Shipping As-
sessment – have become “touchstone documents” that are widely employed by policy-
makers, activists, and scholars (Charron 2012, 771). 
Building on the AEPS, the Arctic Council has principally focused its activities 
on issues related to environmental monitoring and conservation, sustainable economic 
development, and emergency preparedness and response. Indeed, five of its six Working 
Groups focus exclusively on environmental issues, and the sixth is mandated to work for 
sustainable economic development.1 The Working Groups’ findings have been influen-
tial, inspiring high-level policy change and international agreements, such as the Stock-
holm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Fenge 2012, 64). More recently, all 
eight Arctic states have signed two multilateral treaties under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council that enhance cooperation in areas related to public safety. In 2011, members 
signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic, the first legally binding instrument established under the auspices of the 
Arctic Council, followed in 2013 by the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pol-
lution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. The main features of these treaties are 
commitments to collaborate in case of a search and rescue or oil spill emergency, which 
includes information sharing and cooperation between Arctic militaries, coast guards, and 
other agencies. This demonstrated a significant expansion of the Council’s activities into 
important new policy areas, including those which, as discussed below, necessitate the 
deployment of military and paramilitary assets. 
Although it has some noteworthy achievements, the Arctic Council has particu-
lar limitations. It was established through a multilateral executive agreement rather than 
a formal treaty, and thus lacks international legal personality (Bloom 1999). The Council 
only established a permanent secretariat in 2013, and continues to experience challenges 
related to its capacity and the resources necessary to fulfil research and its other mandated 
activities. It is also specifically limited in its ability to address security issues. Indeed, the 
very first article of the Ottawa Declaration (Arctic Council 1996) that established the 
Council includes a caveat specifying that it “should not deal with matters related to mili-
tary security.” This provision was included in the text at the Council’s founding because 
                                                
1 The Arctic Council’s Working Groups are: Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Moni-
toring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emer-
gency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
(PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).  
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the United States insisted that extending the mandate to include military security could 
interfere with America’s global security and defense interests (Bloom 1999, 714; Nord 
2006, 301). As a result, the Arctic Council has focused its activities on ‘soft’ policy areas 
pertaining to the environment, economic development, and political representation for the 
region’s Indigenous peoples. 
Military security cooperation among most Arctic states has thus principally oc-
curred through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The significant excep-
tion to this is Russia, as NATO was founded to deter the Soviet Union and protect its 
members – of which five possess Arctic territory – against the prospect of Soviet/Russian 
aggression. After the Cold War ended, there was considerable cooperation in the Arctic 
region between post-Soviet Russia and its Arctic neighbors, notably Norway, on a range 
of military issues, including decommissioning Soviet nuclear materiel and limiting the 
flow of conventional armaments (Eriksson 1995). More recently, there has been growing 
regional military coordination outside of NATO. In June 2013, Greenland hosted the first 
meeting to include the defense chiefs from all eight Arctic countries. This summit 
strengthened cooperation in the areas of marine surveillance, search and rescue (SAR), 
and expanded joint military exercises, and built upon the SAR agreement reached in 2011. 
The meeting specifically addressed military security issues excluded from the Arctic 
Council’s mandate, and built upon other progress in security cooperation among the 
member-states pertaining to search and rescue. It also signified important military coop-
eration between Russia and the other seven Arctic states, five of which were its foes dur-
ing the Cold War. Such cooperation was brief, however, as regional relations have been 
strained by new tensions related to the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in spring 
2014, its on-going support for armed separatist proxy militias in eastern Ukraine, and 
Western sanctions imposed as a result. 
The expansion of the Arctic Council’s work into areas like search and rescue 
and emergency preparedness and response has situated it at the center of emergent areas 
of Arctic policymaking. In the process, its activities have effectively broadened to include 
new areas linked to a range of regional security issues, including the management and 
deployment of military assets (Chater 2014; Chater and Greaves 2014; Greaves 2013). 
This has led analysts to discuss whether the Council may be assuming a greater role in 
regional security cooperation. Charron (2012, 774) notes: “One area that was thought to 
be verboten was that of matters related to military security. However, given that the [SAR 
Agreement] necessitates the coordination of the states’ military, coast guard, police, and 
transport services for rescue purposes, hard security may be entering into the agenda by 
stealth.” Wilson (2016, 63) also observes that, “over time, such practices in the ‘soft se-
curity’ sphere may help to erode the practical effect of the Ottawa Declaration’s prohibi-
tion of ‘hard security’ discussions from the Council.” While still developing, the expand-
ing scope of the Council’s activities into areas involving military assets has raised new 
questions about the Council’s role in governing regional security. 
The argument that the Arctic Council may, in fact, be involved in managing mil-
itary security issues is more controversial than the claim that it has been actively involved 
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in making policy around a number of issues that affect human and the environmental 
security in the region (Chater and Greaves 2014; Greaves 2013; Hoogensen Gjørv et al. 
2014; Wilson 2016). True, the Council remains fairly weak in terms of its ability to affect 
substantive outcomes in the region, providing a forum for interstate negotiation rather 
than an autonomous actor for Arctic governance. However, its very establishment fos-
tered important changes in the nature of Arctic politics, particularly with respect to envi-
ronmental protection, human security, and Indigenous peoples. Indeed, the Arctic Coun-
cil has contributed to the changed post-Cold War regional security context in which un-
derstandings of Arctic security have been widened to include a greater range of issues. 
At the same time at the Arctic Council’s establishment, “the very meaning of security 
was also being extended beyond traditional concerns with ‘military’ threats to focus on 
environmental and societal problems such as health, cultural survival, freedom of expres-
sion and security of communication” (AHDR 2004, 219). In this light, it is appropriate to 
investigate how the Arctic Council has used security language and whether and how it 
has articulated the nature of security issues within the region. 
 
Security Issues and the Arctic Council 
 
The structure and nature of the Arctic Council raise a number of relevant questions for 
securitization, with the most important being: which entities does the actor-audience re-
lationship necessary for successful securitization operate between? International govern-
mental organizations (IGOs) pose a number of theoretical and empirical challenges for 
securitization in this regard, particularly the question of whether they are best understood 
as fora for state actors to make security claims to other states (in which case the authori-
tative audience would be the organization’s executive body, such as the United Nations 
Security Council, or the plenary comprising all the organization’s members) or whether 
they can operate as securitizing actors or audiences in their own right (Hanrieder and 
Kreuder-Sonnen 2014; McInnes and Rushton 2011). The answers will vary depending 
upon such factors as the IGO’s mandate and organizational structure, institutional auton-
omy and legitimacy, whether it possesses an independent legal personality, and how its 
decision-making mechanisms operate. Some IGOs may be able to effectively advocate 
for particular issues to be understood as security-relevant while others will not, just as 
some may possess sufficient capabilities, resources, and independence from their mem-
bers to operate as an audience for the acceptance of securitizing moves made before it. 
For the Arctic Council, there are several possibilities as to how the relationship 
between securitizing actors and audiences might operate. Theoretically, the Council could 
be an audience for securitizing moves brought by its Member States or Permanent Partic-
ipants; or the Council, particularly through its Working Groups, could play the role of 
securitizing actor identifying issues of concern for the Arctic region and communicating 
these to the Member States and Permanent Participants for their acceptance. If one were 
to disaggregate the work of the Council’s Working Groups from its biannual ministerial 
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meetings, it is also possible that the working groups could frame security issues for the 
consideration of the Council’s decision-making body. 
However, we argue here that the Council’s lack of a founding treaty providing 
it with legal personality, the formal exclusion of security issues from its mandate, its con-
sensus-based decision-making, and its lack of independent monetary or other policy re-
sources make it less persuasive to view it as an audience for securitization. Rather, it 
seems more appropriate to view the organs of the Arctic Council as articulating uncon-
ventional security issues for consideration by its members and, perhaps, other authorita-
tive audiences beyond the Arctic region such as other IGOs. This is particularly so given 
that the Council operates on the basis of consensus, whereby all of its decisions and out-
puts require the approval of all members and, de facto, of the Permanent Participants, as 
well (Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006). Since each of its members is able to exercise a 
veto, the Council as a whole cannot be conceived as an audience with particular agency 
independent of the states and Indigenous peoples that comprise it. Each member acts as 
an audience of one that must be convinced for the Council as a whole to support a deci-
sion. As a result, the Arctic Council is not best understood as an audience for the adjudi-
cation of securitizing moves, but rather as consisting of sub-components (members, In-
digenous peoples, and working groups) positioned to make security claims for the con-
sideration of other audiences (including Arctic Council Member States) with the authority 
and capacity to effectively respond. 
The data in this section are drawn from textual and discourse analysis of publicly 
available documents from 1996-2016 archived online by the Arctic Council, such as Dec-
larations and Senior Arctic Officials meetings reports, Legally-Binding Agreements, Ob-
server States Reports, and Working Group documents.2 These provide a broad, repre-
sentative sample of the Arctic Council’s policy outputs, and can be reasonably expected 
to include instances of how it articulates security issues in the region. As of January 2017, 
there were 1678 documents archived in the Arctic Council’s database. Of these, 1299 
were produced after 2006, indicating a substantial increase over time in the number of 
policy documents produced by the Council and its Working Groups. Keywords such as 
‘security’, ‘insecurity’, ‘threat’, and ‘danger’ were employed to search for uses of security 
language that might indicate threats being depicted to Arctic referent objects. This pro-
duced 55 documents that also included variations like ‘securities’ and ‘insecurities’. 
These documents were then examined to assess whether their use of security language 
suggested the construction of a threat-referent relationship or was ‘adjectival’ in nature. 
Upon analysis, there is evidence to suggest that the Arctic Council depicts cer-
tain issues as relevant to security in the Arctic. However, most of the Council’s instances 
of security language conform to adjectival uses of security rather than securitizing moves 
that identify specific threats in the region. Through its use of security language, the Coun-
cil generally describes policy areas in which current conditions could be improved such 
                                                
2 Arctic Council Archive Home. 2017. “Arctic Council Repository.” Available from: <https://oaar-
chive.arctic-council.org/>. 
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that conditions of human life in the region might be made better or more resilient. Overall, 
it appears that the Council does not employ such terms to construct issues as existentially 
threatening and requiring an urgent response from its members. 
For instance, of the 11 major Arctic Council declarations issued from 1996-
20153, seven contained references to ‘security’, but the first such reference is the footnote 
to the Ottawa Declaration that prohibits the Arctic Council from dealing with military 
security, which is clearly not a securitizing move. Other uses of security in the declara-
tions refer to “human security” (Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting 2000, 15), 
“energy security” (Ninth Ministerial Meeting, ‘Information for Press’, 2015, 20), and 
most of all, “food security” (Barrow Declaration 2000, 4; Notes from the Second Minis-
terial Meeting 2000, 5 and 12; Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Min-
isters, Barrow 2000, 13; Nuuk Declaration 2011, 6; Iqaluit Declaration 2015, 7). Some 
of this language appears to be borrowed directly from the Arctic foreign policies of mem-
ber-states, as with the reference in the Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting ap-
pended to the Barrow Declaration that discussed “enhancing the security and prosperity 
of Canadians, especially northerners and aboriginal peoples” (2000, 15). This phrasing 
directly echoes the human security discourse that briefly influenced Canada’s Arctic pol-
icy in the early 2000s (Greaves 2012). However, none of these uses of security language 
construct a threat-referent relationship, but rather describe or develop plans to address the 
various human, energy, and food security challenges faced by Arctic inhabitants. 
Similarly, 13 documents from Arctic Council ministerial meetings from 2000 to 
2015 mention ‘security’ or ‘insecurity’ in relation to a variety of non-military issues. 
These issues are often mutually constitutive and interrelated such that one is seen to affect 
or produce others in related but distinct policy areas. For instance, the 2002 Senior Arctic 
Officials (SAO) Report to Ministers discusses security in reference to food security and 
persistent toxic substances in the Russian North (14). The 2004 SAO Report discussed 
the potential for cooperation on data gathering and information exchange in the Arctic 
similar to the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security network that exists else-
where (15), the importance of the RAIPON/AMAP food security initiative (18), and a 
statement from the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre on its assessment of 
the importance of the Arctic for the security and reliability of European energy supplies 
(45). The 2006 SAO Report discusses an AMAP report on food security in relation to 
Indigenous peoples in the Russian North (12) and a number of projects related to envi-
ronmental protection and security (47). The 2011 SAO Report discussed the intent of the 
incoming Swedish chairmanship to focus on food and water security and safety (27), 
while the 2013 SAO Report refers to SDWG projects on food and water security (5). 
Although beyond the core scope of this article, a similar assessment can be made 
of recent documents from Arctic Council Observers, which provide descriptive accounts 
                                                
3 There are 11 declarations, but for our purposes three other documents associated with these declarations 
were also analysed: a page of “Notes” and a “Report of Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) to Arctic Council 
Ministers”, both presented during the Barrow Declaration, and a document containing ‘Information for 
Press’ associated with the Iqaluit Declaration.  
Politik  Nummer 3 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 40 
of security-related issues including: space satellites and maritime rules-based governance 
and security (European Commission 2016, 12-14), environmental protection and security 
(Observer Report: Spain 2016, 5; Observer Report: China 2016, 5), and human security 
(The University of the Arctic 2016, 3; The International Union for Circumpolar Health 
2016, 3). Arctic Council members, Permanent Participants, and Observers discussed pos-
sible security issues related to these areas, but did so without constructing specific threat-
referent relationships or invoking the survival of the object in question. Specifically, the 
European Union (European Commission 2016) is primarily concerned with space tech-
nology and the role of satellites in contributing to environmental, safety, and security 
needs (2016, 4; 2016, 12), maritime security threats and maritime rules-based governance 
dialogue with Arctic stakeholders (European Commission 2016, 13; European Commis-
sion 2016, 14), as well as continued research in security matters (European Commission 
2016, 17). Spain (Observer Report: Spain 2016) had similar concerns, as their observer 
report suggested a preference for fostering peacekeeping, environmental protection, and 
security (Observer Report: Spain 2016, 5), but they were the only two that echoed such 
sentiments in their documents. The rest of the Observers were much more focused on 
human security matters related to food security (University of the Arctic 2016, 3) and 
environmental security (Observer Report: China 2016, 5). Noticeably absent from any of 
this discussion is the World Wildlife Fund, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland, and the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region (SCPAR). 
The generally adjectival nature of these uses of security language can be con-
trasted with the securitizing potential of the terms ‘food security’ and ‘food insecurity’, 
which are the most common uses of security language by the Arctic Council. For instance, 
the Arctic Resilience Interim Report (2013) includes many more references to ‘security’ 
than any other document because it contains a chapter devoted to food security, under-
stood as a condition where people are able to access and afford the nutrition necessary 
for their wellbeing. The Arctic Resilience Interim Report discusses food insecurity as a 
subset of welfare-related discussions around poverty and welfare support within Inuit 
communities (2013, 117). However, in the context of social and ecological changes oc-
curring at both local and regional scales across the Arctic, references to ‘food insecurity’ 
may actually depict a more acute emerging threat to the survival of Arctic peoples facing 
inadequate access to reliable food supplies. The 2011 Food-based Dietary Guidelines in 
Circumpolar Regions (Jeppesen, Bjerregaard, and Young 2011, 30) outlines a framework 
for dealing with food insecurity among the Inuit population in Nunavut. The Arctic Hu-
man Health Initiative (Parkinson 2013, 24) and the AMAP Assessment of Human Health 
in the Arctic (AMAP 2009, 21, 46, 203; AMAP 2015, 42) also include specific references 
to diet and food insecurity among Indigenous populations, suggesting a threat-referent 
relationship whereby ‘food insecurity’ poses dire threats to continued health and survival 
of Indigenous populations in the region. In some contexts, ‘food insecurity’ may thus 
invoke quite direct threats confronting specific Arctic populations. 
Politik  Nummer 3 | Årgang 20 | 2017 
 
 41 
Recently, the discourse has shifted further towards the human security dimension of Arc-
tic governance. The 2015 SAO Report notes that security has been discussed in terms of 
gender equality with explicit reference to human security and the material and cultural 
well-being of northern residents (39), interest by multiple Working Groups in food and 
water security (52-73), and energy security in remote Arctic communities (74). However, 
as with most other uses of security language by the Arctic Council, references to human 
security typically do not provide clear or explicit threat-referent relationships. For exam-
ple, the above studies of food and health security provide explicit and detailed reference 
to communities in danger, what those dangers are (such as specific chemical pollutants), 
and proposes solutions about how to deal with those. By contrast, the 2015 SAO Report 
that discusses gender equality with explicit reference to human security and the material 
and cultural wellbeing of northern residents is more vague about who is threatened and 
why, providing a more descriptive account of the dangers involved (2015, 39). Such a 
description is also found in the Gender Equality in the Arctic report (Hoogensen Gjørv 
2014, 59), which refers to the way in which states might actually contribute to the pro-
duction of insecurity for some actors while seeking security for itself. The Arctic Social 
Indicators report similarly provides a descriptive account of insecurities associated with 
social and cultural life whereby their absence can “predict life satisfaction” (Larsen and 
Schweitzer 2013, 294). 
The adjectival nature of the Arctic Council’s use of security language is sup-
ported by the fact that while uses of ‘security abound there is little discussion of ‘insecu-
rity’ or ‘danger’ in the same documents. In fact, there is no mention of ‘insecurity’ or 
‘danger’ in any of the Arctic Council’s declarations. Documents from the ministerial 
meetings refer to insecurity sparingly along the same themes discussed above, while the 
Arctic Resilience Interim Report (2013) refers to ‘danger’ in discussions around endan-
gered species preservation (80), dangerous travel conditions (83), and the Endangered 
Species Act (104). There are no references to insecurity in the Observer States reports 
either, though there is some mention of ‘danger’ in the Ministerial Meetings documents 
that variously either echo the necessity of protecting threatened or endangered species 
(SAO Report 2006, 17), and understanding that education is lacking in relation to the 
dangers of certain human behaviors, especially the ability of communities to educate ex-
pectant mothers of the dangers of certain behaviors (The Future of Children and Youth in 
the Arctic 2000, 17), and the protection of endangered Indigenous languages (The Arctic 
Council Secretariat, Keeping Our Traditions Alive 2015, 28). Further reference to ‘dan-
ger’ in these documents involve the dangers associated with shipping and natural re-
sources exploitation and oil spill preparedness response (SAO Report 2011, 6), and Ice-
land’s national responsibility as codified by domestic legislation to protect the country 
from actions that endanger human health, resources, or ecosystems (Agreement on Co-
operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 2011). 
Overall, this analysis suggests that particular uses of security language in the 
documents produced by the Arctic Council indicate, at most, the construction of a specific 
threat-referent relationship in which the survival of certain Arctic populations, mostly 
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Indigenous, is threatened by lack of access to food. More commonly, however, the use of 
security language in the Council’s documents is adjectival, and does not connote the con-




Drawing on the evidence from the Arctic Council’s repository of documents from 1996-
2016, three preliminary conclusions can be made about the role of the Council in the 
social construction of regional security issues. First, by producing these documents, the 
Arctic Council has contributed only modestly, and perhaps indirectly, to the social con-
struction of unconventional issues as relevant to security in the Arctic. The research of 
the Council’s Working Groups provides useful data that may be used by other regional 
actors in various ways, including to articulate their own security claims. But overall, it 
does not appear that the Arctic Council itself attempts to construct issues as security rel-
evant. In short, the Arctic Council does not particularly function as a securitizing actor 
attempting to construct issues as existentially threatening. While there are various possi-
ble explanations for this, a likely one is that international institutions that lack robust 
organizational structures, legal personality, or policy-making autonomy are unlikely to 
be in a position to articulate security claims independent of their member states. This is 
even more likely when decisions are made on the basis of consensus, whereby the Coun-
cil’s outputs must reflect the positions of all eight of its members and the Permanent 
Participants. 
Second, although the Arctic Council does not function as a securitizing actor per 
securitization theory, it does make considerable use of adjectival forms of security lan-
guage to describe preferred or improved conditions for Arctic peoples, societies, and eco-
systems. Many issues ranging from human- to state-centric concerns are described as be-
ing security-relevant. In this respect, the adjectival use of security by the Council reflects 
the considerable challenges posed by the pace and scale of regional changes associated 
with phenomena such as environmental change and economic modernization, and the 
numerous ways in which the conditions of existence in the Arctic region can be improved. 
The key distinction is that whereas these adjectival uses of security identify aspirational 
conditions that can be worked towards through changes in practices and policies, they 
generally decline to identify specific relationships of existential danger to specific refer-
ent objects. 
Finally, while the Arctic Council may not function particularly as a securitizing 
actor, a different question is raised by the analysis in this article: namely, whether the 
Council has been an audience for the securitizing moves of other actors, and thus whether 
its extensive use of adjectival security language to describe an array of Arctic issues re-
flects its acceptance of other actors’ security concerns. Though this requires further re-
search to fully answer, the fact that Permanent Participants and environmental organiza-
tions with observer status at the Arctic Council have made extensive use of securitizing 
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language to refer to issues of gravest concern to them – and to mobilize an effective po-
litical response to phenomena such as climate change and loss of Indigenous cultures and 
languages – suggests one possible avenue for future study. This article thus provides an 
analytical starting point to examine whether a more appropriate way to perceive the Arctic 
Council is not as an actor advancing security claims of its own, but as a forum in which 
others might make securitizing moves with a chance to be heard and enacted by a group 
of powerful states with considerable capabilities to respond to the many challenging is-
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